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CHRISTIANITY AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF
ABANDONED CHILDREN IN THE LATER ROMAN
EMPIRE
Joshua C. Tate*

A.H.M. Jones, the great British historian of the later Roman
Empire, was once asked what difference conversion to Christianity made
to Rome. His answer: None.' Brutal gladiatorial contests continued to
be held, slavery was not abolished, and cruel penalties were laid down
for seemingly minor moral infractions.2 Thus, Jones reasoned, the actual
impact of Christianity on secular Roman society is difficult to see.
Jones's view, however, has not been universally shared, particularly
when it comes to the Roman legal system. Biondo Biondi saw
Christianity as bringing about "un profundo rivolgimento" in late Roman
law, which had ramifications in many different areas.3 As a religion,
Christianity differed in unmistakable ways from its pagan competitors,4
and it would be quite surprising if these differences did not have some
impact on Roman law and society when Christianity was adopted as the
official state religion. The late Roman era offers a fertile testing ground
for the impact a nascent religion might have on a society and its legal
institutions.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. I would like to thank Jessica
Dixon, Peter Gamsey, Lisa Hasday, Jeffrey Kahn, David Johnston, and Rose Villazor and those
who attended my presentation at the 2007 Law and Literature International Colloquium in
Swansea for their comments on this essay. I am also grateful for the assistance of Alvin Dong and
the research staff of the Biddle Law Library of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where
I had the pleasure of visiting during the Spring 2008 semester, as well as Lynn Murray and the
staff of the Underwood Law Library at SMU Dedman School of Law. The research for this essay
was funded in part by a generous grant from the Emily Parker Endowed Faculty Research Fund at
SMU Dedman School of Law. This essay is dedicated to John Crook, late Professor of Ancient
History at the University of Cambridge, who inspired generations of students to study the law and
life of Rome.
1. Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100-400), at 154 n. 25
(Yale U. Press 1984).
2. See e.g. Ramsay MacMullen, What Difference Did Christianity Make?, 35 Historia:
Revue d'Histoire Ancienne 322, 322-343 (1986). On the legal aspects of the question, see Judith
Evans-Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine's Marriage
Legislation (Oxford U. Press 1995).
3. 1 Biondo Biondi, DirittoRomano Cristiano 1 (Giuffr 1952) (Italian).
4. See e.g. Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints 21 (U. Chi. Press 1981); Robin Lane Fox,
Pagans and Christians22 (Knopf 1987).
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This Essay will discuss the possible impact of Christianity in one
particular area of late Roman law, namely, imperial legislation dealing
with abandoned or exposed children. I will begin by summarizing some
historical background as well as previous work on the subject. I will
then move on to discuss the Christian religious discourse that was
prevalent in the Roman Empire in late antiquity and how it addressed the
problem of abandoned children. Next, I will analyze the various
imperial constitutions that were issued on the subject from the age of
Constantine to that of Justinian. I will argue that the legislation of
Constantine was not distinctly Christian in content, but that some
Christian influence can be seen in the rhetoric of imperial constitutions
beginning in the fifth century, and that Christian ideas seem to have
affected both the substance and the rhetoric of Justinian's legislation.
Particular emphasis will be given to the use of the word misericordia in
a constitution of Honorius to refer to the actions of the collector of
abandoned children, as well as the notion, in Justinian's legislation, that
adoption entails freedom. I will conclude by drawing an analogy
between the legislation of Justinian and modem attempts to regulate the
adoption of children. Both the reforms of Justinian and the modem UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child have arguably privileged moral
over economic arguments concerning children's rights.
The question of the legal status of abandoned children in late
antiquity is not a new one, and has been explored by historians for some
time.' To some degree, the wealth of literature on the topic can be
explained by the fact that the notion of "abandonment" can encompass
the sale of children by their parents, an issue treated at length in ancient
legal sources.6 Even if the issue of simple abandonment or exposure' is

5. For an introductory bibliography, see William V. Harris, Child-exposure in the Roman
Empire, 84 JRS 1 n. 2-3 (1994). For the most recent treatment of the issue, see Timothy S. Miller,
The Orphans of Byzantium: Child Welfare in the ChristianEmpire 148-152 (Cath. U. Am. Press
2003).
6. D. 20.3.5; D 21.2.39.3; Sent. Paul. 5.1.1; CJ 8.16(17).l (197); CJ 7.16.1 (Caracalla); CJ
8.16(17).6 (293); CJ 7.16.37 (294); CJ 2.4.26 (294); CJ 4.43.1 (294); Frag. Vat. 33-4
(Constantine); CT 11.27.2 (322); CT 4.8.6 (323); CT 5.10.1 (329?); CJ 4.43.2 (329?); CT 3.3.1
(391); Sirm. Const. 5 (419); Nov. Val. 33 (451). The two issues of sale and exposure are often
treated side by side in Roman legal sources, and are also usually discussed together in the modem
secondary literature. Cf Maria Bianchi Fossati Vanzetti, Vendita ed esposizione degli infanti da
Costantino a Giustiniano, 49 SDHI 179, 188 (1983) (Italian). I have focused my discussion on
issues regarding simple abandonment as opposed to sale.
7. Boswell prefers the term "abandonment" over "exposure," believing that the English
word "exposure" conveys "a sense of risk or harm ... which is absent from the ancient terms."
John Boswell, The Kindness ofStrangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europefrom
Late Antiquity to the Renaissance 24-25 (Penguin Press 1988). 1 have used the two terms
interchangeably, following Harris, supra n. 5.

123]

LEGAL STATUS OFABANDONED CHILDREN

considered apart from the related problem of sale, the precise
development of the law over the centuries is far from clear.
One point of consensus in recent scholarship, however, is that the
law regarding the exposure of infants was not modified substantially, but
merely refined and explained, during the years between Constantine and
Justinian.8 So long as one is concerned merely with the practical
consequences of the law, this assertion is not difficult to sustain,
although specific objections could be raised to it. As far as can be
ascertained from the sources, following a notable reform under
Constantine in 331, 9 several laws were passed on the subject during the
fourth and fifth centuries,' ° but it was not until the reign of Justinian that
the legal position of abandoned children was drastically modified." The
picture of the intervening period is altered somewhat once one takes into
account not just the practical effects of the laws being passed, but the
intellectual discourse that they seem to reflect. Even from an ideological
perspective, there is insufficient evidence to prove that the centuries
between Constantine and Justinian were a time of radical change. If we
are to discern Christian influence in the law, however, its roots are not
likely to be found in the legislation of Constantine, as has been
previously supposed, but in the new ideological perspective of
Justinian's reform as foreshadowed in the fifth century. 2
In discussing the ideological climate in which late antique laws
were written, one cannot avoid coming to grips with the rise of
Christianity, which clearly affected the way many people thought about
themselves, about each other, and about their God. This is far from
saying that Christianity had any significant effect on the way in which
people behaved,' 3 or that a single "Christian discourse" held sway in the
Mediterranean to the exclusion of all other Christian discourses. 4
Moreover, the discourse of Christian bishops such as Augustine of
Hippo and Ambrose of Milan was not identical to the discourse that

8. Michael Memmer, Ad servitutem aut ad lupanar. . . Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsstellung von
Findelkindern nach r6mischen Recht-unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung von §§ 77, 98
Sententiae Syriacae, 108 ZRG:RA 79-80 (1991) (German); Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 202.
9. CT 5.9.1.
10. CJ 8.51(52).2 (374); CT 5.9.2 (412); Sirm. Const. 5 (419).
11. CJ 8.51(52).3 (529); Nov. Just. 153 (541).
12. Some readers may object to my occasional use of the emperor's name to describe "his"
legislation. The convention persists despite our new attentiveness to the complex process by
which legislation was created.
13. MacMullen, supra n. 2.
14. Averil Cameron, Christianityand the Rhetoric ofEmpire: The Development of Christian
Discourse 5 (U. Cal. Press 1991). Or, for that matter, that paganism did not remain alive and well
throughout much of the period.
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thrived in the law schools, despite the likelihood of mutual influence:
when Augustine was asked to resolve certain civil suits in his diocese,
he did not attempt to pass judgment according to Christian teaching, but
rather sought the advice of a layman named Eustochius who was
apparently learned in the civil law.' 5 As would become important in his
theology, Augustine thus acknowledged a difference between the law of
Christ and the law of Rome. 16
"Orthodox"' 7 Christian thought likely affected civil legislation on
abandoned children in two ways: through direct references to the
consequences of abandonment and through general theological ideas
presented in other contexts but relevant in an indirect way to the
question of exposure.
In examining direct discussions, Boswell
differentiates between early Christian apologists," who were primarily
concerned with condemning the act of abandonment itself, and later
writers, 19 who more frequently took into account the often desperate
circumstances that drove parents to take such a step.z°
The Christian theologian Lactantius represents a transitional phase
between these two periods of thought, and gives a typical Christian
description of the act of exposure.2 ' While condemning exposure as
tantamount to killing, and referring to the possibility that the exposed
child could be attacked by dogs, Lactantius nevertheless recognizes that
some abandoned infants actually survived and must be accounted for in
Christian thinking, for he points to prostitution and slavery as other
possible evils awaiting the unfortunate child."2
Unlike most previous Christian writers, however, Lactantius also
takes into account the fact that some parents were driven to such a
desperate act of exposure by their abject poverty, although he dismisses

15. Augustine, Epistle 24*.
16. The fact that Augustine, as a religious authority, seems to have been engaged in active
correspondence with a secular jurist points to a manner in which the two discourses were
becoming interlinked. While we should never assume that the views of the church fathers were
identical to those of lawyers and imperial officials, it would be equally misguided to suppose that
the one had no effect upon the other.
17. Due to the limited source material that has come down to us, this discussion will
necessarily focus on the strands of Christianity that later came to be termed "orthodox." This does
not imply, however, that other Christian traditions, such as Pelagianism, where not also at certain
stages in a position to influence imperial legislation.
18. Such as Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis35 (PG 6.969), Justin Martyr, 1 Apology 27
(PG 6.369-372), and Minucius Felix, Octavius 31 (PL 3.336-337).
19. In particular Basil of Caesarea, Homilia in Illud Lucae, Destruanm 4 (PG 31.268-269), and
Ambrose, De Tobia 1.8.29 (PL 14.769-770).
20. Boswell, supra n. 7, at 157-172.
21. Id. at 160-161.
22. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.20 (PL 6.708-709).
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this as being no excuse. Indeed, he argues that God daily makes the
poor rich and that those who cannot afford children ought to abstain
from intercourse. 3 A notable aspect of Lactantius's treatment of
exposure, however, is his emphasis on the deed itself and the persons
responsible for it, rather than the act of piety on the part of someone else
who takes pity on the child and brings it under his or her care.
A focus on the abandoned child's rescuer is especially present in
the later Christian sources, but it is usually expressed through allegory
and not treated alongside other aspects of abandonment. Discussing the
behavior of eagles that had apparently been observed to abandon some
of their young, 24 Ambrose noted that the abandoned eaglets were
subsequently rescued and taken under the care of another bird called the
fulica.25 Animal behavior was frequently cited by Christian writers as a
model for human morality,26 and it is not difficult to see how this
metaphor would have been interpreted as an exhortation to take pity on
abandoned children.
The corpus of Christian writings yields many other general ideas
that may have influenced contemporary views on abandonment. One
must be careful, however, not to assume that the same connections a
modern historian might make were also present in the minds of ancient
thinkers. For example, one Christian tradition that may or may not have
been influential concerns the ancestry of Christ. In the New Testament
accounts given in Matthew and Luke, Christ's genealogy was reckoned
through the ancestors of Joseph, his earthly father, rather than directly
from God.27 To explain this fact, Christian thinkers like Augustine of
Hippo defended Joseph's paternity by praising the institution of adoptive
parenthood, using arguments that could have influenced legal notions
about the relationship between an abandoned child and the person who
collected it. Explaining in a sermon how Joseph's right to be called
father was all the more secure because he did not beget Jesus by the
flesh, for example, Augustine points to the laws of adoption in defense
of his case:
Look, brothers, look at the laws of adoption, by which means a
man becomes the son of someone from whose seed he was not
born; so that the will of the one adopting has more of a right over
him than the nature of the one producing. Therefore Joseph must
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
As noted by Basil of Caesarea, Homilia VIII in Hexaemeron 6 (PG 29.177-180).
Hexaemeron 18.61 (PL 14.232).
Boswell, supra n. 7, at 168.
Matt 1:2-17; Luke 3:23-38 (all Biblical citations are taken from the RSV).
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not only be reckoned a father, but most greatly so. 28
Adoption, argues Augustine, had a long history in the Old
Testament. Moses himself was exposed (expositus) by his mother and
then adopted (adoptatus)by Pharaoh's daughter; while the ancients did
not have the modem legal formulae, "the judgment of the will was held
as a rule of law.",29 Augustine is clearly using the story of Moses in
order to make a particular rhetorical point, but the possibility that such
comments might have influenced contemporary ideas regarding the
relationship between expositi and those who collected them cannot be
dismissed.
Much closer to the core of Christian teaching relevant to
abandoned children are two passages drawn from the New Testament
and often discussed by patristic writers. The first, in the gospel of John,
speaks of Christ's rejection by his own people and subsequent reception
among the believers, who thereby became children of God, not through
the flesh, but through God's will.30 This passage was interpreted by later
writers as referring to the transition whereby the Christians replaced the
Jews as God's true children.3 ' According to Ambrose, although the
Jews had been originally named as heirs, they could not come into their
inheritance, for they had not received adoption by the grace of God.32
What this adoption entailed was clarified in a second scriptural passage:
All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. For you did
not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have
received the spirit of sonship. When we cry, "Abba! Father!" it is
the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are
children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and
fellow heirs with Christ, provided we
suffer with him in order that
33
we may also be glorified with him.
In the view of Ambrose, freedom, grace, adoption, and heirship were
inexorably linked: as the Jews
did not have the first three, they were
4
sons in name but not in spirit.1

28. Augustine, Sermon 51:16 (PL 38.348). Here as elsewhere, I give my own English
translation of quotations from the Latin sources.
29. Id. at 51:18 (PL 38.349). The reason for the exposure of Moses, according to the Biblical
account, was to protect him from being killed under an Egyptian law ordering that all male
Hebrew infants be put to death. Exod 1:16-22.
30. John 1:11-13.
31. Ambrose, Epistle 75 (PL 16.1257-1259); Cyril of Alexandria, Commentarius in S.
JoannisEvangelium 1:9 (PG 73.149-157).
32. Ambrose, Epistle 75:4 (PL 16.1258).
33. Rom 8:12-17.
34. Ambrose, Epistle 75:5 (PL 16.1258).
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The link between adoption and freedom was also emphasized by
John Chrysostom. The Jews were called sons, but failed to lose the
spirit of bondage, unlike the Christians, who were saved by grace and
thereby received freedom as true sons. 35 Therefore the spirit of adoption
received by the Christians was a far greater honor than the spirit of
bondage known to the Jews. 6 As regularly presented in sermons and
exegetical commentaries, these ideas would probably have made an
impact on any authorities familiar with the Christian religion. Even
more significant, however, is their inclusion in a set of baptismal
instructions authorized by John Chrysostom for use in churches subject
to his jurisdiction. At various points in the instructions, the officiating
priest is to remind the catechumens of how the act of baptism entails
their adoption as sons of God and subsequent release from temporal
bondage. 37 Through their baptism, the catechumens became not only
38
free, holy, and just, but even sons of God and joint-heirs with Christ.
Repeated so often in such an important context, this message must have
made a major impact on the thinking of Christian congregations and
those with whom they interacted.
Turning to the legal sources, the first question that must be asked is
what approach classical Roman law took on the question of abandoned
children. Although gaps in the surviving evidence prevent us from
arriving at a comprehensive reconstruction of the legal status of
abandoned children prior to Constantine's acceptance of Christianity, we
do know from a number of sources that the act of exposure in and of
itself did not, at least in theory, affect the free or slave status of infants
who had been exposed or their responsibilities to their rescuers.39 A
freeborn child who was exposed and subsequently collected could again
regain its freedom via the vindicatio in libertatem or return to the power
of its father under the vindicatio in potestatem, whereas the slave child
exposed without its master's knowledge or permission remained his
property and could be reclaimed as such.a° In reality, of course, many
freeborn expositi were treated as slaves, 41 either because their birth
status was unknown or because they were unable to prove it. Even the
release of those freeborn servants whose original status was not in doubt
35.
36.
37.
50:150,
38.
39.
40.
41.

John Chrysostom, Homilia XIV in Joannem 2 (PG 59.93).
John Chrysostom, HomiliaXIV in Epist. ad Romanos (PG 60.525-526).
John Chrysostom, Baptismal Instructions 2:29, 3:5 & 5:22, in Sources Chrtiennes
153 & 311.
Id. at 3:5, in Sources Chr6tiennes 50:153.
Pliny Ep. 10.65-66; D. 22.6.1.2; D. 40.4.29; CJ 8.51(52).1 (224).
Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 182-183.
Memmer, supra n. 8, at 47.
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seems in many cases to have been made conditional on the repayment of
the expenses incurred in raising them.4 2 Whether this repayment
condition constituted a general lex de alimentis is a matter of dispute,4 3
but it seems to have been regularly applied for reasons of equity. The
collector, therefore, was reimbursed for expenses incurred in raising the
child, but the relationship between the two had no other legal
significance.
So far as can be ascertained, Constantine's early legislation on
abandoned children did not deviate markedly from the classical position.
We know of two laws, one dating from 322 and the other probably from
329,44 both of which authorize the provision of food from the imperial
storehouses in an effort to assist starving parents who would not
otherwise be able to support their children. These laws are reminiscent
of the alimentary program developed by Trajan, although they differ in
being temporary measures probably instituted in response to a particular
crisis.45 Another law, ascribed to 329 in the manuscript tradition but
moved to 319-20 by Seeck,4 6 seems to refer to the exposure as well as
the sale of newborn infants, and solidifies the classical principle that a
child could be reclaimed upon payment of the expenses incurred by the
rescuer or buyer in raising it. 47 Notably, this permission to reclaim one's
children was revoked in a constitution of 331:
Whoever may have collected a boy or girl that was expelled from
the house of its father or master with (the latter's) will and
knowledge, and raised it to strength by means of his own
nourishment, may retain said child in the same state that he
thought to have in mind when he picked it up, that is, whether he
preferred the child to be a son or a slave. All disturbance by
reclaiming on the part of those who knowingly and by their own
will cast newborn slave or free infants 48 out of the home is to be
42. CJ 8.51(52).l (224); CJ 5.4.16 (Tetrarchic); but see also Pliny, Ep. 10.65.6, which seems
however to have been applicable only to Bithynia.
43. Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 184-187.
44. CT 11.27.1-2. CT 11.27.1 (329?) is directed to Italy, while CT 11.27.2 (322) is aimed at
Africa. On the dating of CT 11.27.2, see Harris, supra n. 5, at 20 n. 175.
45. Judith Evans-Grubbs, Constantine and Imperial Legislation on the Family, in The
Theodosian Code: Studies in the Imperial Law of Late Antiquity 135 (Jill Harries & Ian Wood
eds., Duckworth 1993).
46. Otto Seeck, Regesten der Kaiser unde Papste 65 (J.B. Metzler 1919) (German). Seeck's
view is endorsed by Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 195, but Harris, supra n. 5, at 20 n. 179, is
unconvinced.
47. CT 5.10.1. Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 196-198, holds that "vel nutriendum putaverit" does
not refer to the exposure of children, but rather to a kind of gratuitous transfer. But see Memmer,
supra n. 8, at 62-64.
48. "Liberos" could be read either as an adjective meaning "free" or a noun meaning
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completely dispelled.49
Addressed to Ablabius, Praetorian Prefect,5" this constitution also makes
clear that the rule preserving the birth status of abandoned children is
abrogated; they are henceforth under the control of the persons who
collected them, who can retain them as free children or as slaves
according to their preference. The connection between collector and
expositus, formerly of little or no legal significance, was now the only
relationship recognized by the law.
As preserved in the Code, this constitution does not explain
Constantine's motive behind providing collectors with comprehensive
authority over abandoned children, which suggests that the original edict
has been shortened by the compilers.51 This has not, however, prevented
modem scholars from speculating about Constantine's intentions. 2
Vanzetti, for example, has argued that this constitution exhibits a
newfound desire to protect life at all costs, regardless of the status that
children occupied, and attributes this to Christian influence.53 This
argument is based on a particular interpretation of the economic effects
of Constantine's reform. By specifying that exposed infants could not
be reclaimed by their parents or masters and allowing the collector to
keep such children in whatever status they saw fit, Constantine's new
law would allegedly have had the effect of encouraging the collection of
abandoned children. 4 Collectors would be more willing to rescue
children if they could treat them as slaves without fear of reclamation by
the parents.
However, it is not clear whether this law would have actually
encouraged more collection. The collector's position was hardly
insecure prior to Constantine's reform, insofar as s/he could expect the
return of the alimenta should the child be reclaimed. Moreover, the
"children."
49. CT 5.9.1.
50. Ablabius probably began his career with Constantius Caesar in Italy, but moved to the
new imperial capital of Constantinople in 330 and stayed at the court of Constantine until 335 or
336. A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale, & J. Morris, The Prosopographyof the Later Roman Empire
Vol. 1: AD 260-395, at 3 (Cambridge U. Press 1971).
51. As demonstrated by Frag. Vat, 35 and 249, Constantine's original laws, like those in the
Novels appended to the CT, were usually prefaced with lengthy explanations of the reasons that
led the emperor to act: see Evans-Grubbs, supra n. 2, at 45. Honor6 has explained how the
preamble and epilogue were systematically deleted by the Theodosian compilers. Tony Honor6,
The Making of the Theodosian Code, 103 ZRG:RA 159-160 (1986).
52. Harris, supra n. 5, at 21.
53. Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 188 & 200-202.
54. Vanzetti does not spell out this economic argument, but it seems implicit in her statement
that "molto realisticamente Costantino ha creato le condizioni pin adatte per mitigatre le
conseguenze delle frequenti esposizioni: gli effetti giuridici vengono da s6." Id. at 201.
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possibility of keeping the child as a slave had always existed de facto:
even in the classical period, the collector's decision to keep the child in
servitude could be challenged only after the child's birth status had been
legally proven.
Even if one could accept the argument that Constantine succeeded
in encouraging the collection of expositi through his reform, however,
there is no reason to suppose that he legislated with this purpose in
mind.55 One can easily suggest other reasons that may have led the
emperor and/or his consistory to change the law: they may have decided
to make the law reflect what had always occurred in reality, or they may
simply have been moved by the facts of a particular case of which we

are unaware.
On their face, the Constantinian reforms seem to reflect little
Christian influence given their direct contradiction with the Christian

writers: whereas these writers had cited the enslavement and prostitution
of exposed children as arguments against abandonment, Constantine
specifically allows the child to be reared as a slave.56 Moreover, the
notion that parents should strive to rear as many children as possible out

of civic piety was scarcely a new strain in Roman thought.57
Constantine's disapproval of exposure could merely have been directed
at the selfish behavior of those parents and masters who neglected to
respect the interests of the state. In the absence of further evidence
about the specific causes that motivated Constantine's reform, the case
for a distinctly Christian impetus is tenuous. All we can say is that

55. Vanzetti claims that the emperor was likely to have been worried about depopulation of
the empire as a result of war and famine, id. at 187, and similar demographic motives have been
cited by others, e.g. Memmer, supra n. 8, at 66, and Harris, supra n. 5, at 21. This explanation,
however, is not very convincing. On the one hand, Constantine's civil wars against Maxentius
and Licinius took place nearly a generation before his decision in 331 to reform the law on
expositi: any lingering effects on the population could scarcely have been significant. Regarding
the other issue, Vanzetti seems to confuse occasional food crises or shortages with long-term
famine: on this distinction, see Peter Garnsey, Famine and the Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman
World: Responses to Risk and Crisis 6 (Cambridge U. Press 1988). The notion that the later
Roman empire suffered from a long-term manpower shortage, moreover, was effectively refuted
some three decades ago by Moses Finley in his review of Arthur Boak's Manpower Shortage and
the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West, 48 JRS 156-164 (1958). Short-term concerns about the
population of specific provinces are conceivable, as evidenced by CT 11.27.1-2, but this begs the
question of how such localized concerns could lead to an edict regarding the collection ofexpositi
that was binding for the whole empire. In any case, it is doubtful whether Constantine or the
imperial officials who served under him applied such sophisticated economic analysis to
legislation on exposure.
56. See Evans-Grubbs, supra n. 46, at 136. In general, the extent of Christian influence on
Constantinian legislation has been exaggerated; see Evans-Grubbs, supra n. 52, passim.
57. Centuries before Constantine, for example, it was emphasized by the Stoic philosopher
Musonius Rufus. See Boswell, supra n. 7, at 86-88.
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Constantine's reform strives to assure others that exposure is wrong.
Following the reform of Constantine, the next legal reference to
exposure that has come down to us apparently dates from the reign of
Valentinian I.8 It focuses more on the duty of parents not to abandon
their children than on the rights or responsibilities of rescuers.
Declaring that each and every person must nourish his or her own
offspring, a constitution of 374 subjects those who fail to do so to "the
punishment that had been laid down."59 Opinions differ on the
significance of this last phrase,6 ° but it has been frequently considered
alongside a law, issued one month before, specifying that any man or
woman who committed the piaculum, or "sin that requires expiation," of
killing an infant, was subject to capital punishment.61 Uncertainties
about the original context and content of these laws make it difficult to
draw any conclusions about their significance. If Valentinian did in fact
outlaw child exposure and infanticide in 374, this could reflect the
influence of contemporary Christian thinkers such as Lactantius; indeed,
the use of the word piaculum in the law of infanticide does suggest

58. The extant text is probably corrupt. As preserved in the Code of Justinian, CJ 8.51(52).2
(374) reads:
Unusquisque subolem suam nutriat. quod si exponendam putaverit, animadversioni quae
constituta est subiacebit.
§ 1. Sed nec dominis vel patronis repetendi aditum
relinquimus, si ab ipsis expositos quodammodo ad mortem voluntas misericordiae amica
collegerit: nec enim dicere suum poterit, quem pereuntem contempsit.
Sec. I of the text, however, is virtually identical to the beginning of CT 5.9.2 (412): "Nullum
dominis vel patronis repetendi aditum relinquimus, si expositos quodammodo ad mortem voluntas
misericordiaeamica collegerit, nec enim dicere suum poterit, quem pereuntem contempsit." This
suggests two possibilities: either the author of the Honorian constitution copied the language used
in an earlier constitution of Valentinian, or the Justinianic compilers conflated the two
constitutions in their Code. The latter view, held by Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 215-216, seems to me
more probable. Such a reference to reclaiming by masters and patrons would be more natural in a
constitution that alters the procedure for registration of expositi than in a criminal law about the
act of exposure itself, although it is not clear why the Justinianic compilers would have inserted it
in the latter. The phrase "voluntas misericordiaeamica collegerit," moreover, is reminiscent of
Sirm. Const. 5, unquestionably attributed to Honorius's reign, although the latter constitution
differs in content from CT 5.9.2, as discussed below. I have therefore not treated § 1 of CJ
8.51(52).2 in my discussion of Valentinian's legislation. If the phrase does in fact date from
Valentinian, this would move the inception of the rhetorical trends discussed below from the early
fifth to the late fourth century, but would not otherwise affect the argument.
59. CJ 8.51(52).2 (Mar. 374).
60. Emiel Eyben, Family Planning in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, 11-12 Ancient Socy. 31
(1980-81), and Harris, supra n. 5, at 22, suggest that the penalty specified in CJ 8.51(52).2 is
"probably" a reference to capital punishment. Boswell, supra n. 7, at 162-163, gives little weight
to this interpretation. The statement of H. Bennet, The Exposure of Infants in Ancient Rome, 18
CJ 351 (1923), that exposure was made a capital crime in 374 is too categorical.
61. CT 9.14.1 (Feb. 374). It is difficult to believe, however, that infanticide and exposure
could have been viewed as equivalent, since exposure did not always result in the death of the
child.
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moral outrage rather than civic self-interest.62 Without knowing for
certain whether the earlier constitution on infanticide was somehow
linked to the later regarding parental duties and exposure, however, it is
difficult to cite emotional language in the infanticide constitution as
evidence of similar concerns in the abandonment law. And, as in the
case of Constantine's legislation, the notion that parents had some kind
of civic obligation to rear their children was not peculiar to Christianity;
any suggestion of Christian influence behind the decision to enforce
such a duty must remain speculative.
From the beginning of the fifth century, however, it is possible to
discern a tendency reminiscent of Christian teaching in the rhetoric, if
not the content, of the surviving legislation on exposure. The first law
demonstrating this trend was issued by Honorius in 412 and addressed to
Melitius, Praetorian Prefect:
We leave no approach of reclaiming to masters or patrons, if good
will, the friend of compassion, collected those exposed by a certain
means to death (si expositos quodammodo ad mortem voluntas
misericordiae amica collegerit), for no one can call his own that
which he scomed when it was perishing: if only the signature of a
bishop as witness should follow, concerning which for the purpose
of security there can be no delay.63
While the first part of this edict adds nothing substantive in practice to
64
Constantine's reform apart from mentioning patroni as well as domini,
the rhetoric of the edict suggests a change in thought about the status of
abandoned children. To be sure, the procedural change in the second
section, which orders the registration of collected infants with a bishop,
has been downplayed by Memmer, who argues based on the Sententiae
Syriacae that some such registration had been required even under
Constantine. Memmer claims that all Honorius did was substitute an
episcopal for a civil authority.6 5 Whatever this change may tell us about
the effectiveness of the Church as an administrative body in the fifth
century, it does not in itself point to any major ideological shift in the
perception of abandoned children.
What is different about this constitution, however, is the rhetoric of
the first sentence, in particular the phrase "si expositos ... misericordiae
amica collegerit." This emphasis on the gracious act performed by the
collector is new in late imperial legislation on abandonment: There is no
62.
63.
64.
65.

Harris, supra n. 5, at 21-22.
CT 5.9.2.
Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 216.
Memmer, supra n. 8, at 92.
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trace of it in Constantine's reform, which speaks only in general terms
of the provision of alimenta that causes the child to grow to strength.66
The use of the term misericordia (compassion) in Honorius's law is
particularly interesting. This word does not appear in any surviving
imperial constitutions until the Christian period, where it is frequently
used in the phrases "divina misericordia" or "misericordia dei. ' '67 It
does not require a great deal of imagination to see such language as
reflecting religious sentiment and origins.68
Similarly interesting is another constitution of Honorius dated
seven years later and preserved in the Sirmondian Constitutions.
Although the case for specifically Christian language is less strong, this
constitution recognizes the value of the rescued child:
It is defended with shameless artifice, if those persons are
reclaimed toward their condition or origin, for whom in time of
famine, when they were compelled toward death by scarcity, their
master or patron had not been able to provide assistance. But it is
moreover unjust, if some person should dare hoping by some title
to vindicate as indebted to him a man kept alive (servatum
hominem in lucem) by another's expenses. Therefore, when the
series of events has been inspected concerning those who through
necessity were procured or perhaps collected, let Your
Magnificence see to it that they continue in their ownership; or if
they are clamored for by someone, only when twice the amount
has been paid out which was given in the name of a price and the
expenses have been considered do we permit them to return to the
authority of the one who is vindicating them, lest it be a pitiable
thing thus to have furnished nourishment to one who is dying (ne
sit miserum ita exhibuisse alimoniam morienti), in that another

66. CT 5.9.1 (331); see above.
67. Apart from the dubious constitution CJ 8.51(52).2 discussed above, the word
misericordia in all its forms appear only 5 times in the Code of Justinian according to Robert
Mayr, Vocabularium Codicis Iustiniani, I: Pars Latina (Hildesheim 1965). Four of these
instances date from Justinian (534) and are paired with references to God and the divine (CJ
1.27.1.7 "deus. . .suam misericordiam";CJ 1.27.1.8 "dei misericordiam"; CJ 1.27.1.10 "deus ...
per ipsius misericordiam";CJ 1.27.2.4a "divina misericordia");all of them are included under the
heading "De officio praefecti praetorioAfricae..." The other usage is from a constitution issued
by the emperor Justin in 519 on the subject of natural children (CJ 5.27.7.1). The word is never
used in the pagan constitutions. One might be able to extend this argument by examining the
Digest, but I have not dared to do so because of additional problems of interpolation: see David
Johnston, Justinian'sDigest: The Interpretationof Interpolation, 9(2) Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 149166 (1989). Whether the phrase including misericordia might have been interpolated in CT 5.9.2
by the Theodosian compilers is an interesting question, but one for which I am not prepared to
suggest an answer.
68. The word appears in Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.20 (PL 6.708-9), but one would
hesitate to suggest this as the inspiration for Honorius's law.
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person would profit from someone kept alive (servatus in vitam) at
the collector's expense. 69
It is unclear whether this constitution, which mentions both sale
and exposure, repeals the Constantinian reform since it sets forth a new
procedure for reclaiming.70 More important than the substance of the
law, however, is the manner in which it expresses itself. Exposed
children are not merely "raised to strength" by the one who collects
them, but are literally "saved into the light": the collector has "furnished
nourishment to one who is dying."71
Of course, the use of the word servatum to describe the one who
has thus been kept alive does not necessarily betray Christian sentiment:
a quotation from Florentinus preserved in Justinian's Digest, for
example, derives the word servus (slave) from the practice of "saving"
prisoners of war by selling rather than killing them. 2 Still, with the
word miserum, the author of Honorius's law has without explanation
used an emotionally charged term, no doubt selected to convey the
simple fact that the collector's efforts ought to be recompensed. Though
the use of miserum in this second constitution is not quite as suggestive
as the misericordia of the first, it is worthy of notice. If a case for
Christian influence in this area of imperial legislation is to be made, it
must surely begin with these two constitutions of the fifth century.
Apart from the two laws of Honorius, we do not possess any
imperial legislation from the fifth century that deals directly with
exposure. In light of this rhetorical trend, however, it is interesting to
note the following ecclesiastical canon issued by the Council of Vaison
in 442:
Concerning the exposed, because a complaint goes forth having
been cried out by all that they are exposed not to compassion
(misericordiae) but to wolves, and the human mind, although
affected by the precepts of compassion (quamuis inflexa praeceptis
misericordiae), fails to collect them out of fear of false
accusations, it seems that it must be observed, according to the
statutes of the most faithful, pious, and august emperors, that
whoever collects an exposed child must call the church to witness,
acquire the testimony: nevertheless on Sunday let the priest
announce from the altar, that the church might know that an
exposed person has been collected, so that within ten days from
69. Sirm. Const. 5 (419).
70. Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 218, thinks that the procedure of reclaiming outlined in the latter
part of the law cannot relate to exposure, but see Memmer, supra n. 8, at 75 n. 190.

71. CT5.9.1 (331).
72. D. 1.5.4.2.
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the day of exposure, if someone shows himself to acknowledge it,
let him receive the exposed child: with the pity (misericordia) for
those ten days to be paid back to the collector as he should prefer,
either in the present by man, or in the hereafter with the grace of
God.73
Issued three decades after the first constitution of Honorius, this
ecclesiastical law makes reference to the statuta ... principium, but it is
not clear whether it means to include the law of 412. v4 This canon was
followed by the specification that those who acted in contravention of it
are subject to the ecclesiastical penance for murder, 75 and its regulations
were reaffirmed by two later Gallic councils.76 Apart from the practical
provisions set forth in this law, the rhetoric it employs is quite
interesting, in particular its frequent repetition of the word misericordia
to describe the emotion that led the collector to act. This word
necessarily calls to mind the first law of Honorius, and could be a sign
that the author of that constitution and the church representatives at
Vaison shared a common understanding of the motive that led the
collector to act. 77 Fifth-century legislators and clerics may not have

been of one mind regarding the problem of exposure, but their rhetoric
suggests that they were thinking along similar lines.
Bearing in mind this fifth-century emphasis on the misericordia of

the collector, Justinian's reform falls more clearly into focus, although
its status as a legislative and ideological milestone remains
undiminished. In two successive constitutions, 78 Justinian, or rather his
legal secretary Tribonian,7 9 reversed the Constantinian rule on the
73. Cone. Vasense Can. 9, Corpus Christianorum,Ser. Lat. 148: 100-101.
74. Vanzetti, supra n. 6, at 216-217, argues that this canon spells out the procedure whereby
the testis episcopalis mentioned in CT 5.9.2 was to be obtained. This is disputed by Boswell,
supra n. 7, at 173 n. 115, whose arguments however are not convincing.
75. Conc. Vasense Can. 10, Corpus Christianorum,Ser. Lat. 148:101.
76. Conc. Arelatense Secundum Can. 51, Corpus Christianorum, Ser. Lat, 148:124; Conc.
Agathense Can. 24, Corpus Christianorum,Ser. Lat. 148:204.
77. It might also be cited as an argument in favor of the view that the statuta referred to in the
canon include CT 5.9.2 (412), though this is conjectural.
78. CJ 8.51(52).3, issued in 529 and summarized in CJ 1.4.24; Nov. Just. 153, issued in 541.
79. CJ 8.51(52).3 is among the laws ascribed by Honor6 to the beginning of Tribonian's
quaestorship in 529. Tony Honor6, Tribonian 106 (Duckworth 1978). Nov. Just. 153 is also
alleged to fall within Tribonian's tenure of office, although its use of Greek to specify a fine runs
contrary to Honorr's theories about Tribonian's style, id. at 130-137. Honorr's view of the preeminent role played by Tribonian in the drafting of legislation may be somewhat exaggerated. See
Michael Maas, Roman History and Christian Ideology in Justinianic Reform Legislation, 40
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 17, 27 (1986). But Honor6 suggests that Tribonian was a Christian,
Honor6, op. cit. at 65-67, and whether the reform measures passed during Justinian's reign
primarily reflect the views and rhetoric of the emperor or his quaestor would not thereby affect the
question of Christian influence. In any case, the laws should be judged by their content, not
according to preconceived notions about those responsible for drafting them.
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treatment of expositi and decreed that no exposed child, regardless of its
birth status, could be held as a slave, colonus, adscripticus,or freedman:
henceforth, all exposed children were to possess the rights and privileges
of freeborn men. The constitution is innovative by any reckoning, and
cannot be called a return to classical principles, for it goes beyond all
classical precedent in permitting even slave children to become free
through the act of exposure. 80 The language used to justify such
measures is familiar, as shown in the first reform constitution of 529:
...Those who, with the reason of piety persuading them (pietatis
ratione suadente), picked [exposed infants] up, will not be suffered
to change their own opinion and retain them in servitude, even if
they started out in the beginning having a thought of this kind, lest
their doing such a pious act might seem akin to a contract of
buying and selling (ne videantur quasi mercimonio contracto ita
pietatis officium gerere). 8t
The pious deed
of the collector is also referred to in the second reform
82
constitution.
Like the surviving fifth-century laws, Justinian's reform focuses on
the compassion of the collector that led him or her to save the life of the
child. Unlike preceding legislation, however, Justinian's constitutions
take this mental construction to its apparent logical conclusion: if the
collection of an exposed infant is an act of piety, then it cannot lead to
the enslavement of the child. Whether Justinian or his secretary had
Romans 8:12-17 in mind when they drafted their law is a matter for
conjecture, but the parallel is indeed suggestive. Just as the spirit of
adoption rescued the Christian faithful through God's grace, so did the
collector's act of compassion save the life of the exposed. In both cases,
the beneficiary "did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear,
but... the spirit of sonship." s Adoption into slavery was no adoption
at all.
Justinian's legislation, despite its good intentions, is likely to have
had little practical effect. Only the privileged few would have been able
to plead their case at law, and it must have been difficult for a servant to

80. Justinian's reform actually had two provisions: the first affirming the established rule that
former masters and patrons could not reclaim those exposed with their knowledge or consent, and
the second breaking precedent by preventing the collector from retaining the child in a position of
servitude. The first aspect of the reform is indeed harmonious with classical ideas (Suetonius,
Claudius 25; cf. CJ 8.51(52).1), and this connection is drawn in Nov. Just. 153. The provisions
relating to the collector, however, are completely novel.
81. CJ 8.51(52).3.
82. Nov. Just. 153.
83. Rom 8:12-17.
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prove that he or she had been exposed. In any case, the very fact that the
original reform was reissued twelve years later could be adduced as
evidence that few exposed infants were protected from slavery as a
result of the new law.84 To chastise Justinian on the grounds that his
laws did not produce effective results, however, would be to miss the
point. There is some value to expressing moral principles through
legislation, regardless of its practical effects.
An example drawn from modem law may serve to illustrate this.
In recent decades, the practice of inter-country adoption has come to be
seen as a possible solution to the plight of orphaned children in
developing countries; yet this phenomenon has also given rise to
legitimate concerns.8 5 The Supreme Court of India, for example, handed
down a decision in 1984 that contained a number of guidelines designed
to protect children adopted by foreign nationals from exploitation.86
One of its provisions dealt with exorbitant fees being charged to foreign
adoptive parents by adoption agencies, a practice that was seen as akin
to trafficking in children. The court specified a maximum rate at which
the agency could bill the parents for legitimate maintenance and medical
expenses.8 7 These sentiments were echoed five years later in the
landmark UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Declaring that the
system of adoption must be regulated in a manner so as to "ensure that
the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration," the
signatories promised to "take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in
inter-country adoption, the placement does not result in improper

84. Boswell, supra n. 7, at 191; see also Miller, supran. 5, at 152.
85. See e.g. D. Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry
Adoption: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 Cap. U. L. Rev. 349, 353 n. 18 (2005) (citing recent
literature); Bridget M. Hubing, InternationalChild Adoptions: Who Should Decide What Is in the
Best Interests of the Family, 15 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub. Policy 655, 663-667 (2001)
(discussing arguments for and against intercountry adoption); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging
RacialPreferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1415, 1420-1430 (arguing that race plays
a role in the decisions of Americans to adopt children from abroad); Elisabeth J. Ryan, Note, For
the Best Interests of the Children: Why the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption Needs To
Go Farther as Evidenced by Implementation in Romania and the United States, 29 B.C. Intl. &
Comp. L. Rev. 353, 363-374 (2006) (discussing the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption
and its pending ratification in the United States); David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of
Intercountry Adoption: The Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev.
403, 450-474 (2005) (discussing recent scandals in Andhra Pradesh, India).
86. Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India (1984) (citing Nirmala Pindat, Inter-Country
Adoption: The Indian View, in Parenthoodand Modern Society: Legal and Social Issues for the
Twenty-First Century, 268 (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., Martinus Nijhoff 1993)). The
decision resulted in the creation of a Central Adoption Resource Agency in 1990, which plays a
comprehensive regulatory role in matters relating to adoption in India. See Smolin, supra n. 88, at
443-445.
87. Eekelaar & Sarcevic, supra n. 88, at 272.
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' 88
financial gain for those involved in it.
What the UN delegates may have ignored, however, is that a
certain school of thought has held for some time that legalizing the sale
of newborn infants might reduce the glut of children in foster care while
eliminating the long queues faced by prospective adoptive parents.89
This proposition has met with its share of criticism. 90 In any case, it is
not at all clear whether the perceived economic benefits conceived with
regard to adoption within one country would still hold across
international borders. Nevertheless, accepting for the sake of argument
the notion that a deregulated international market would be the most
effective way to match adoptive parents with children, one might be led
to conclude that the UN Convention acted against children's economic
interests.
If the various modern legislative bodies that have prohibited
international commerce in children out of an expressed concern for their
interests were not contradicting themselves, however, perhaps the
91
"interests of the child" must be defined in a less mathematical fashion.
Only the most cynical analyst would argue that the UN Convention
actually intended, by placing restrictions on profiteering by adoption
agencies, to keep suffering children from prospective loving parents.
Aside from the question of whether the notion of a market in newborn
infants is economically sound, it is highly unlikely the legislators
adhered to such a limited economic definition of "interest" when they
acted to prevent children from being sold.
If all laws were judged on the basis of their immediate practical
consequences, one would have to conclude that the UN Convention of
the Rights of the Child served little purpose, since few children in
developing countries could hope to avail themselves of its many
generous provisions. The significance of the UN Convention, like all
grand statements of legal principle, ultimately derives not from its direct

88. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44 Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
89. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
Leg. Stud. 323-339 (1978), defended in Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in
Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59-72 (1987).
90. For some criticisms, see J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. Toronto L.J.
347-355 (1984); but see Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of
a Baby, 26 B.C. Third World L.J. 61, 65 (2006) (arguing that there is a "de facto, largely
unregulated, adoption free market" already in place).
91. The notion of legislative "interest" is an ambiguous one, and cannot easily be delineated
in purely economic terms. Even the most refined and inclusive economic model cannot capture
all the direct and indirect effects of a particular law, and attempts to derive the intention of the law
from its perceived economic results or vice versa can lead to absurd conclusions.
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results, but from its place in the history of legal thought, and the
Convention has certainly provoked debate.92 Justinian's reform, which
arguably took fifth-century ideological trends to their logical conclusion
and found a new way to consider the "interests of the child," ought to be
evaluated along similar lines.

92. See e.g. Children, Rights, and the Law (P. Alston, S. Parker, & J. Seymour eds.,
Clarendon Press 1992); David M. Smolin, Overcoming Religious Objections to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 20 Emory Intl. L. Rev. 81 (2006). A conference held at the University of
Ottawa from March 15-17, 2007, addressed the many issues that have arisen with respect to the
Convention since its adoption.

